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Abstract
This Note examines the development of judicial interpretation of the noncommercial torts
exception, section 1605(a)(5) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), in United
States law. The Note first traces the historical development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
to its statutory codification. Next, it identifies trends in the interpretation of the torts exception that
have emerged since the enactment of the FSIA. Finally, this Note proposes a coherent, uniform
method of preparing a claim under section 1605(a)(5).
THE NONCOMMERCIAL TORTS EXCEPTION TO THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976' (FSIA) al-
lows a plaintiff to bring a foreign state before a United States
court, either federal or state, obtain a ruling on the sovereign
immunity of the entity, and, if the court does not find immu-
nity, secure an adjudication and satisfaction of its claim. 2 A
central feature of the FSIA is its specification of actions for
which foreign states are not entitled to claim immunity from
jurisdiction The so-called noncommercial torts exception 4
sets forth the circumstances in which a foreign sovereign will
not be afforded sovereign immunity as a result of its tortious
acts or omissions.5
This Note examines the development of judicial interpre-
tation of the torts exception, section 1605(a) (5) of the FSIA, in
United States law. The Note first traces the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to its statutory
codification." Next, it identifies trends in the interpretation of
the torts exception that have emerged since the enactment of
the FSIA.7 Finally, this Note proposes a coherent, uniform
method of preparing a claim under section 1605(a)(5).8
I. HISTORY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The common law doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign
immunity dominated United States law until 1952, when the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity replaced the absolute
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
2. Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 878 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp.
849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. A foreign state may not claim immunity when it has waived
immunity, or when the action is based upon a commercial activity, certain property
rights, certain noncommercial torts, or specified suits in admiralty. Id.
4. Id. at § 1605(a)(5); see infra text accompanying note 36 (noncommercial torts
exception).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5); see infra text accompanying note 36 (noncommercial
torts exception).
6. See infra notes 9-37 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-110 and accompanying text.
8. See iq/a notes 111-38 and accompanying text.
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theory. The FSIA, which codified the restrictive theory in
1976, was a legislative response to international disputes for-
merly governed by the Executive branch of the government.
Absolute foreign sovereign immunity originated in an era
of personal sovereignty when sovereign rulers were above the
law.9 To avoid friction between nations and to preserve the
dignity of other sovereigns, the states exempted foreign sover-
eigns from their jurisdiction.' 0 Most advocates of the doctrine
of absolute immunity considered all acts of a sovereign to be
public or governmental acts, not private or commercial acts.''
In the United States, the absolute theory of foreign sovereign
immunity was recognized in the early 1800's,12 and the abso-
lute notion that the executive branch of government should
conduct foreign affairs was embraced by United States courts
in the 1940's.'
9. Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148
(1954). The common law maxim, "the King can do no wrong," expressed the es-
sence of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1148 n.3.
10. Id. at 1148. This accordance of immunity between sovereigns was reciprocal
in nature; failure to grant similar treatment to a foreign state was an indication of
either hostility or superiority. Id. Thus, in order to maintain peaceful relations, sov-
ereigns granted each other complete and full immunity. Id. at 1148 n.4.
In the Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), Chief
Justice Marshall brought this absolute theory of sovereign immunity to the United
States. When a United States citizen accused Napoleon of "stealing" his ship, Mar-
shall declared "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns" and thus
firmly rooted the notion of absolute foreign sovereign immunity in United States law.
Id. at 136.
11. Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV. 614,
616 (1950). Generally, three arguments were advanced to support this "pure" abso-
lutist position. First, the custom of foreign sovereign immunity preserved the peace
between nations as well as the dignity of the sovereign. Second, it enabled the execu-
tive branch of the government to conduct foreign relations properly. Third, the dis-
tinction between public and private acts of the sovereign was perceived as meaning-
less since all acts of the sovereign were necessarily public. Id. at 616-17.
The distinction between "public" and "private" acts of a foreign sovereign
rested on the nature or purpose of the act. A "public" act was one performed for the
benefit of the public interest. Acts that were political, diplomatic, or military in na-
ture were considered "public." See id. at 616-17. "Private" acts were those which did
not directly benefit the public, such as civil or commercial activities. Thus, when a
sovereign acted as a private individual, the sovereign's actions were "private" and the
sovereign could be subject to jurisdiction. See id. at 620-21.
12. See supra note 10.
13. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-36 (1945); Ex parte Re-
public of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-89 (1943); Compania Espanola De Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938); Exparte Muir, 254 U.S. 522,
533 (1921). In Republic of Mexico, the Supreme Court voiced its approval of a court's
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Motivated by the trend among foreign nations to adopt a
narrower view of foreign sovereign immunity,' 4 in the early
1950's the United States adopted the restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity. 15 The restrictive theory, which excluded pri-
vate acts from the status of "governmental" and therefore pro-
tected acts, was formally adopted by the State Department in
the so-called Tate Letter.' 6 The Executive branch incorpo-
rated the movement toward the restrictive approach into treaty
negotiations with other nations. 7 Thereafter, United States
deference to suggestions by the State Department when a foreign sovereign was
brought into a United States court as a defendant when it noted that "it is an ac-
cepted rule of substantive law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts
that they accept and follow the executive determination .. " Republic of "llexico, 324
U.S. at 36. In fact, a move to a more restrictive theory of sovereign immunity seemed
inevitable when the Court stated: "[iut is therefore not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on
new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize." Id. at 35 (foot-
note omitted). Thus, the Court advised that it would defer to executive suggestions
of immunity, but would also be willing to move to a more restrictive approach if led
there by the State Department.
14. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the U.S. Dep't of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. 2 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as the "Tate Letter"]. The Tate Letter notes, in part,
A trend to the restrictive theory is already evident in the Netherlands
where the lower courts have started to apply that theory.
... In view of the growth of the restrictive theory since [ 1921 ] the Ger-
man courts might [adopt the restrictive approach]....
The newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has always been
supported by the courts of Belgium and Italy. It was adopted in turn by the
courts of Egypt and of Switzerland. In addition, the courts of France, Aus-
tria, and Greece, which were traditionally supporters of the classical theory,
reversed their position in the 20's to embrace the restrictive theory. Ruma-
nia, Peru, and possibly Denmark also appear to follow this theory.
Id. at 712-13.
15. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was based on the rationale that
a foreign sovereign should only be granted immunity for its public acts, and private
acts of a sovereign should be treated the same as any other private individual. See
infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
16. Tate Letter, supra note 14, 425 U.S. at 711 app. 2. This letter advised that
the immunity of a sovereign was to be recognized with regard to governmental or
public acts, jure irnperii, of a state, but not with respect to private acts, jure gestionis;
thus immunity was "restricted" to public acts. Id.
17. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956,
United States-Republic of Korea, art. XVIII, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No.
3947; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-
Netherlands, art. XVII, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, art. XVIII,
para. 3, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024; Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and
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courts adopted the restrictive theory in case analyses involving
foreign nations. "
The adoption of the restrictive theory by the United States
created two problems. First, the United States courts needed
to clarify the definition of "restrictive." Second, plaintiffs who
prevailed in United States courts lacked a satisfactory judg-
ment enforcement procedure. Although the Tate Letter pub-
licly announced adherence to the State Department's restric-
tive theory,'" it failed to set forth explicit guidelines for distin-
guishing between public and private acts.z° Consequently, the
Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. XI, para. 4, 8 U.S.T. 899,
T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
United States-Federal Republic of Germany, art. XVIII, para. 2, 7 U.S.T. 1839,
T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953,
United States-Japan, art. XVIII, para. 2, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, United States-Denmark, art.
XVIII, para. 3, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, Aug. 3-Dec. 26, 1951, United States-Greece, art. XIV, para. 5, 5
U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Aug. 23, 1951, United States-Israel, art. XVIII, para. 3, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No.
2948; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United States-
Ireland, art. XVIII, para. 2, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948-Jul. 26, 1949, United States-Italy, art. XXIV,
para. 6, 63 Stat. 2225. These treaties each contain a provision obligating each con-
tracting party to waive sovereign immunity for state-controlled enterprises engaged
in business activities within the territories of the other. See Setser, The Imnunity
Waiver for State-Con trolled Business Enterprises in United States Commercial Treaties, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF AM. Soc. INT'L L. 89 (1961).
18. E.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-
706 (1976); National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360-
61 (1955); Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971); Petrol
Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
These courts were primarily concerned with the distinction between public and pri-
vate acts, as well as the presence or absence of a State Department suggestion of
immunity. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698-706; National City Bank, 348 U.S. at 360-61;
Heaney, 445 F.2d at 503; Petrol Shipping, 360 F.2d at 110; Victor,y Transport, 336 F.2d at
358-59.
19. "[It will hereafter be the [State] Department's policy to follow the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign govern-
ments for a grant of sovereign immunity." Tate Letter, supra note 14, 425 U.S. at
714.
20. Williams, 653 F.2d at 878; Victory Transport, 336 F.2d at 359-60. The 1icto.'
Transport court noted that while the State Department made its overall policy of re-
strictive immunity clear, the Tate Letter offered no guidelines for differentiating be-
tween a sovereign's private and public acts. Indeed, the court stated that "[w]hile
this criterion is relatively easy to apply, it ofttimes produces rather astonishing re-
sults, such as the holdings of some European courts that purchases of bullets or
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Second Circuit, in Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes,2 ' enumerated categories of tradi-
tionally political or public acts that exempted foreign sover-
eigns from the jurisdiction of the United States courts. The
Victory Transport court concluded that the restrictive theory
mandated that a foreign sovereign be granted immunity in ac-
cordance with these all-inclusive categories, and it further ad-
vised that courts should not venture outside these specific pro-
visions unless the State Department recommended such a de-
parture. 23
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, the Victory Transport
holding stood as the accepted doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity in the United States. 24 However, the procedure for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign was far from
adequate. In addition to the ambiguity of the restrictive immu-
nity concept created by the Tate Letter,25 there was no satisfac-
tory judgment enforcement procedure. -' In cases that denied
shoes for the army, the erection of fortifications for defense, or the rental of a house
for an embassy, are private acts." Victory Transport, 336 F.2d at 359.
21. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
22. Id. at 360. These categories were: internal administrative acts, such as the
expulsion of an alien; legislative acts, such as nationalization; acts concerning the
armed forces; acts concerning diplomatic activity; and public loans. Id.
23. Id. The court stated:
We do not think that the restrictive theory adopted by the State Department
requires sacrificing the interests of private litigants to international comity
in other than these limited categories. Should diplomacy require enlarge-
ment of these categories, the State Department can file a suggestion of im-
munity with the court. Should diplomacy require contraction of these cate-
gories, the State Department can issue a new or clarifying policy pronounce-
ment.
Id.
24. See Heaney, 445 F.2d at 503-04; Petrol, 360 F.2d at 106, 110; Aerotrade, Inc.
v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281, 1282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also Lowenfeld,
Litigating A Sovereign Immunity Claim-The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 412
(1974); Goodman, Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: A Political or Legal Question-Victory
Transport Revisited, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 885 (1972).
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de
la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1964); Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931);
New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684, 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 1087-89,
192 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470-72 (Sup. Ct. 1959). Indeed, even if a plaintiff prevailed
against a foreign state "under international law property of a foreign government
[was] immune from attachment and seizure, and that.., principle [was] not affected
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immunity to a foreign sovereign, absolute immunity from exe-
cution ofjudgment produced a right without any effective rem-
edy.27 These shortcomings created the need for a legislative
solution to what had previously been an executive and judicial
determination.
Recognizing the need to transfer the determination of sov-
ereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial
branch, Congress enacted the FSIA. This codified the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity into United States domestic
law, and brought the United States into conformity with mod-
ern international law.2" The primary rationale supporting the
enactment of the FSIA was to clarify the procedure by which
parties could obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state in the
courts of the United States, and also to establish the circum-
stances in which a foreign state would be entitled to immu-
nity.2 )
The FSIA sets forth mandatory jurisdictional require-
ments, conferring subject matter jurisdiction over nonjury civil
actions in courts of the United States when the foreign state is
not entitled to sovereign immunity,3" and personal jurisdiction
by [the Tate Letter], in which the Department of State indicated its intention to be
governed by the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in disposing of requests
from foreign governments that immunity from suit be suggested in individual cases."
New York & Cuba Mail, 132 F. Supp. at 685; see Atkeson, Perkins, and Wyatt, H.R.
11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70
AM.J. INT'L L. 298 (1976); Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 455 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 69 (1965).
27. Williams, 653 F.2d at 878; see Note, Sovereign Immunity-Proposed Statutory Elim-
ination of State Department Role-Attachment, Service of Process, and Execution-Senate Bill
566, 93d Congress, 1st Session (1973), 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 157, 165 (1974); Note, The
Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns in U.S. Courts-Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 473, 489-90 (1973); Reeves, supra note 26, at 455.
28. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6605-06 [hereinafter cited as "HouSE REPORT"]. Indeed, it is
noted in the legislative history that this statute would replace the traditional policy of
deference to State Department suggestions of immunity, reduce the foreign policy
implications of immunity determinations, and assure litigants that these decisions
were made on purely legal grounds, under procedures that insure due process. Id. at
6606-07; see also National Airmotive Corp. v. Government and State of Iran, 499 F.
Supp. 401, 406 (D. D.C. 1980) (primary purpose of FSIA was to depoliticize sover-
eign immunity decisions by transferring them from the executive to the judicial
branch of government).
29. HousE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6604.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). This section reads:
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whenever subject matter jurisdiction exists and service of pro-
cess has been made. 3' Both personal and subject matter juris-
diction turn on whether the foreign state is entitled to sover-
eign immunity. If the dispute does not fall within one of the
enumerated exceptions to immunity, the court lacks both sub-
ject matter and personal jurisdiction. 2 Therefore, sovereign
immunity is not merely a defense under the FSIA; rather, its
absence is a jurisdictional requirement.3 3
Section 1604 of the FSIA sets forth the basic grant of im-
munity to foreign sovereigns.3 1 Section 1605 then carves out
specific exceptions to this grant of jurisdictional immunity.3 5
The noncommercial torts exception, section 1605(a)(5) of the
FSIA, provides:
a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States in any case-
5) ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either
under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international
agreement.
Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982). This section states that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction
over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district
courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under
section 1608 of this title." Id. Legislative history reveals that this federal long-arm
statute was patterned after the District of Columbia's long-arm statute. HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 28, at 6612.
32. Olsen by Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984).
33. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 n.20
(1983). The Supreme Court recently noted that while sovereign immunity is an af-
firmative defense which must be specifically pleaded, subject-matter jurisdiction still
turns on the existence of an exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Thus, if a
foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert the immunity defense, the courts
still must consider whether immunity is available under the FSIA. Id. at 493 n.20.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Section 1604 provides: "Subject to existing international
agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." Id.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. This in fact is an opposite result of the I'ictoyv Transport
categorization approach, which provided an exclusive means of granting immunity.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (Victory Transport categorization ap-
proach).
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property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any offi-
cial or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph
shall not apply to-
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercises or perform a discretionary function
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) Any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or in-
terference with contract rights.3 6
Although Congress codified the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity to eradicate the vagaries of the common law, the judicial
interpretation that followed the enactment of the FSIA has be-
come almost as diversified as its common law predecessor. 7
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
NONCOMMERCIAL TORTS EXCEPTION
The noncommercial torts exception was intended to bring
certainty and consistency to an area of tort law that had previ-
ously lacked such qualities 8.3  Following 1976, individuals who
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). The FSIA also defines essential terms. A "foreign
state" includes "a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state." Id. at § 1603(a). An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" means "any entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States . . . nor created under the laws of any third country." Id. at 1603(b). The
"United States" includes "all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States." Id. at § 1603(c).
37. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. Prior to the enactment of the
FSIA, tort claims against foreign sovereigns were considered in light of the absolute
or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, or under either of these theories plus the
Act of State doctrine.
During the period when the United States followed the absolute position on sov-
ereign immunity, a foreign state could not be sued without its consent. In United
States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520 (1875), the Court stated:
One nation treats with the citizens of another only through their govern-
ment. A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent.
His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents, prevents
his appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another sover-
eignty, except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, vol-
untarily assumed. Hence, a citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of
another nation, must seek redress through his own government. His sover-
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believed they had been wronged tortiously by a foreign sover-
eign sought jurisdiction under the FSIA.
A. Torts Within the Scope of Section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA
Rather than explicitly enumerate those torts for which an
individual may sue, section 1605(a)(5)(B) of the FSIA strictly
forbids certain causes of action. Subsection B of the noncom-
mercial torts exception is clear and unambiguous on its face.
Courts have uniformly agreed that they will not grant jurisdic-
tion if a plaintiff alleges a tort action based on libel, slander,
deceit, misrepresentation, interference with contract rights,
malicious prosecution, or abuse of process."' In addition, a
reading of statutory and case law suggests that only noncom-
eign must assume the responsibility of presenting his claim, or it need not
be considered. If this responsibility is assumed, the claim may be prose-
cuted as one nation proceeds against another, not by suit in the courts, as of
right, but by diplomacy, or if need be, by war. It rests with the sovereign
against whom the demand is made to determine for himself what he will do
in respect to it. He may pay or reject it; he may submit to arbitration, open
his own court to suit, or consent to be tried in the courts of another nation.
All depends upon himself.
Id. at 524. When the sovereign assumed the responsibility of presenting the individ-
ual's claim, only a grievous wrong would initiate a confrontation between the two
sovereigns. The Act of State doctrine created this situation. The basic tenet of the
doctrine was that courts of one independent government could not sit in judgment
on the validity of the acts of another independent government done within its own
territory. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897).
During the restrictive period, the Act of State doctrine precluded courts from
inquiring into the validity of public acts of a foreign sovereign. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Victor, Transport, 336 F.2d at 363.
Moreover, while some tortious wrongs of a purely private nature might be compensa-
ble, trial procedures could still make suits impractical if not inconvenient. Note, Pro-
cedural Aspects of a Claim of Sovereign Immunity by a Foreign State, 20 U. Prr-r. L. REV. 126
(1958); see Note, Torts: National and International Sovereign Immunity, 16 OKLA. L. REV.
457, 465 (1963).
39. See Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 517 F. Supp. 477, 485 (D. D.C. 1981), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (deceit, interference with con-
tract rights); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900, 913 (E.D.
La. 1981), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985) (malicious prosecution, abuse of pro-
cess, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, interference with contract rights);
United Euram v. U. of Soviet Socialist Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (interference with contract rights); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp.
1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (interference with
contract rights); Yessenin-1/olpin, 443 F. Supp. at 855 (libel).
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mercial torts are actionable under section 1605(a)(5)."
The statutory language of the torts exception provides
general areas of tortious activity that may be actionable. Sub-
ject to further qualification,4 a proper case is one "in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property . . 4 In
deference to this clause, courts have recognized that personal
injury actions, 43 wrongful death actions,44 and, in at least one
case, an action in conversion4 5 may be proper tort claims
within the meaning of section 1605(a)(5). 4( However, courts
seem unwilling to go beyond these boundaries, and have yet to
permit jurisdiction in any action not based on death, personal
injury, or property rights.4 7 Such holdings represent a narrow
40. See United Euram, 461 F. Supp. at 612. FSIA section 1605 "[slubsection
(a)(5) was intended to cover noncommercial torts .. ." Id.; see Olsen, 729 F.2d at 645;
Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 247 (1984); In Re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D. Tex. 1982). The
statutory language of the torts exception also makes this clear by explicitly noting
that this section refers to actions "not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) [the
commercial activities exception] above .... 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
41. See infra notes 65-91 and accompanying text (examining the situs of the tor-
tious act and injury and the discretionary functions provision).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
43. Persinger, 729 F.2d 836-37; Perez v. Bahamas, 652 F.2d 186, 188 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); Skeen v. Fed. Repub. of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414,
1416 (D. D.C. 1983).
44. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643; Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329,
330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 510 (1984); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985); Kline v. Re-
public of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D. D.C. 1985); Castro v. Saudi Ara-
bia, 510 F. Supp. 309, 312 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.
Supp. 665, 671-74 (D. D.C. 1980).
45. De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La.
1981). In De Sanchez, a Nicaraguan citizen who left her country during the 1979
revolution that ousted the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle brought suit against
the Banco Central de Nicaragua to recover $150,000 on a check drawn in her favor
by that bank. The court held that the defendant foreign sovereign would not be
granted immunity under the noncommercial torts exception and the court rejected
the defendant's argument that liability must be limited to physical personal or prop-
erty damage. Id. at 913; see infra note 92.
46. However, with the exception of three cases, Olsen, 729 F.2d 641; De Sanchez,
515 F. Supp. 900; Letelier 488 F. Supp. 665, every reported case which has considered
the noncommercial torts exception as applied to a foreign sovereign defendant has
declined to find jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
47. See Persinger, 729 F.2d 835 (parents of a former Iranian hostage sued the
Republic of Iran for mental and emotional distress); Frolova v. Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1983), afd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985)
(action for loss of consortium by a plaintiff against the Soviet Union for refusing to
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judicial interpretation of which torts will suffice to disallow im-
munity under the FSIA.
The legislative history of the FSIA also suggests which
torts should be actionable under section 1605(a)(5). This his-
tory states that while section 1605(a)(5) was directed primarily
at the problem and effects of traffic accidents, it was also in-
tended to apply to all tort actions for money damages not
otherwise encompassed by the commercial activities excep-
tion.4" Thus, the legislative history of the FSIA indicates that
any noncommercial tort action requesting money damages is,
in fact, encompassed by section 1605(a)(5). However, no court
has been willing to broaden this scope accordingly, although a
few have acknowledged this piece of legislative history.49
Therefore, further support exists for the proposition that
courts will take a narrow view of which torts give rise to accept-
able causes of action in a section 1605(a)(5) case. 0
B. The Proper Defendant
Congress intended a foreign state or its political subdivi-
sion to be the proper defendant to an action under the FSIA. 5 1
Section 1603 of the FSIA defines terms essential to the deter-
mination of the proper defendant in all sovereign immunity ac-
allow her husband to immigrate to the United States); Castro, 510 F. Supp. 309 (ac-
tion for negligent entrustment of an automobile to a Saudi Arabian soldier).
48. House REPORT, supra note 28, at 6619-20. Section 1605 (a)(5)
denies immunity as to claims for personal injury or death, or for damage to
or loss of property, caused by the tortious act or ommission of a foreign
state....
The purpose of section 1605(a)(5) is to permit the victim of a traffic
accident or other noncommercial tort to maintain an action against the foreign
state....
Id. (emphasis added).
49. McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 243 (1984); Frolova, 558 F. Supp. at 362; Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567;
De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 913; Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 672.
50. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). "A 'foreign state,' except as used in section 1608 of
this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)." Id. "[T]he term 'foreign state'
... includes not only the foreign state but also political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities of the foreign state. The term 'political subdivisions' includes all
governmental units beneath the central government, including local governments."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6613.
FSIA TORTS EXCEPTION
tions.52 A "foreign state" has the same definition for both the
commercial activities exception and the noncommercial torts
exception to the FSIA. 53 In many noncommercial tort cases
already decided, a foreign government was the defendant in
the action.54 For FSIA purposes, an "agency or instrumental-
ity of a foreign state ' 55 is also considered to be a foreign
state.
In Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency,5 7 the court identi-
fied the three-part statutory test set forth in section 1603(b)
used to determine whether a defendant is a proper agency or
instrumentality under the FSIA. 5' First, the defendant must be
a "separate legal person, corporate or otherwise .... "9 Sec-
ond, it must not be a citizen of the United States.60 Third, the
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
53. HOUSE REPORT, supra, note 28, at 6613. "The term foreign state [is] used in
all provisions of chapter 97 except section 1608." Id.; see Gilson, 517 F. Supp. at 480;
De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 902 n.3; Carey, 453 F. Supp. at 1100 n.2; lessenin-Volpin,
443 F. Supp. at 852.
54. Berkovitz, 735 F.2d 329 (Iran); Olsen, 729 F.2d 641 (Mexico); McKeel, 722
F.2d 582 (Iran); Perez, 652 F.2d 186 (Bahamas); Kline, 603 F. Supp. 1313 (El Salva-
dor); Castro, 510 F. Supp. 309 (Saudi Arabia). But see Skeen, 566 F. Supp. 1414. In
Skeen, the plaintiff brought suit against the government of Brazil alleging that the
grandson of a Brazilian ambassador assaulted him outside a local nightclub. The
court declined to hold the government of Brazil responsible for the grandson's ac-
tions, stating that even if one assumed that the ambassador's grandson was acting as
an agent of the Republic of Brazil, he was not acting within the "scope of his employ-
ment" within the meaning of section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA. Id. at 1417-19. Addi-
tionally, Skeen is significant as the only case to discuss the "scope of employment"
portion of section 1605(a)(5).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means any entity-(l) which
is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ
of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose
shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under
the laws of any third country.
Id.
56. Id. at § 1603(a); see supra note 51.
57. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
58. Id. at 852.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1). The HousE REPORT states:
The first criterion, that the entity be a separate legal person, is intended to
include a corporation, association, foundation, or any other entity which,
under the law of the foreign state where it was created, can sue or be sued in
its own name, contract in its own name or hold property in its own name.
HousE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6614.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3). The HOUSE REPORT states:
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defendant must be "an organ of a foreign state or political sub-
division thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other owner-
ship interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof.. ..'"'I"
The Yessenin court applied this test to the defendant press
agency and determined that it was an agency or instrumental-
ity, and therefore a foreign state, for FSIA purposes. - Other
courts, while generally noting section 1603, have not applied
this test as explicitly as in Yessenin; however, every court which
has considered this issue in a torts context has determined that
the defendant was an agency or instrumentality for section
1605(a)(5) purposes. Thus, the terms "foreign state" and
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" are broadly con-
strued by the courts."4 This trend may reflect a realization by
the courts that such an interpretation is beneficial to both par-
ties: to the plaintiff, who must establish this fact to obtain ju-
risdiction, and to the defendant, who must prove its status as a
foreign state to be granted immunity.
[This] criterion excludes entities which are citizens of a State of the United
States ... for example a corporation organized and incorporated under the
laws of the State of New York but owned by a foreign state. (See Amtorg
Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).) Also excluded
are entities which are created under the laws of third countries. The ration-
ale behind these exclusions is that if a foreign state acquires or establishes a
company or other legal entity in a foreign country, such entity is presump-
tively engaging in activities that are either commercial or private in nature.
HousE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6614.
Legislative history also reveals that a citizen of any foreign state, such as an am-
bassador or consul, was also not an intended defendant. Id. at 662.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). Additionally, the HOUSE REPORT states:
If such entities are entirely owned by a foreign state, they would of course
be included within the definition. Where ownership is divided between a
fbreign state and private interests, the entity would be deemed to be an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state only if a majority of the owner-
ship interests (shares of stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign state or by
a foreign state's political subdivision.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6614.
62. Y'essenin-'olpin, 443 F. Supp. at 852-54. The court also noted the difficulty
that may be encountered in precisely applying this test since the nature of U.S.S.R.
agencies could be quite different from our own. Id.
63. See Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 565 (exploration agency): De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp.
at 902 (commercial bank); Gilson, 517 F. Supp. at 480 (corporations): Carev. 453 F.
Stipp. at 1100 n.2 (oil corporation); lesseni-f'olpin, 443 F. Supp. at 852-54 (press
agency, telegraphic agency).
64. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
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C. The Situs of the Act and Injury
Since the enactment of the FSIA, the situs of the tortious
act has become crucial to establishing jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1605(a)(5). 5 Although the statute itself is silent on this
issue and seems only to require that the injury occur within the
United States, the legislative history of the Act states that "the
tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of
the United States.""6 Further, at least one circuit, the District
of Columbia, has unequivocally stated that both the act and
resultant injury must occur in the United States,"7 and several
other circuit and district courts are beginning to follow this
trend .68
65. It is clear from the statutory language of the noncommercial torts exception
that the injury, death, or loss or damage of property complained of must occur in the
United States. The torts exception applies to "any case ... in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss
of property, occurring in the United States and caused by a tortious act or omission of
that foreign state .. " 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (emphasis added); see Berkovitz, 735
F.2d at 331; Persinger, 729 F.2d at 839-40; Perez, 652 F.2d at 188-89; Tel-Oren, 517 F.
Supp. at 549 n.3. This includes all territory and waters subject to United States juris-
diction. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c); McKeel, 722 F.2d at 587; see Perez, 652 F.2d at 188.
However, unlike the injury provision of the FSIA, the situs of the tortious act or
omission is less clear on the face of the statute. See infra notes 66-74 and accompany-
ing text.
66. HousE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6619.
67. Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1524
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1751 (1985); Persinger, 729 F.2d at 842-43;
Perez, 652 F.2d at 189.
Although the statutory provision is susceptible of the interpretation that
only the effect of the tortious action need occur here, where Congress in-
tended such a result elsewhere in the FSIA it said so more explicitly. See 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (immunity withheld for acts "outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States"). The
legislative history makes it clear that for the exception of § 1605(a)(5) to
apply "the tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the '
United States."
Asociacin, 735 F.2d at 1524 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6619).
The requirement that both act and injury occur in the United States is consistent
with the old "Act of State" doctrine. See supra note 38. Because the Act of State
doctrine applies to those actions of a foreign sovereign which occur within the terri-
tory of the foreign sovereign, the FSIA and the common law Act of State doctrine will
neither conflict nor overlap.
68. Accord Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 379 (7th
Cir. 1985) (U.S.S.R. denial of immigration to plaintiffs spouse did not occur in the
United States); .1McKeel, 722 F.2d at 588, (former hostages of Iran brought suit and
the Ninth Circuit held that United States embassies are not to be considered part of
the United States for FSIA purposes; thus both the act and the injury did not occur in
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Only one holding, Letelier v. Republic of Chile,"" has been
completely contrary to this view, but this occurred in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
1980, prior to the District of Columbia circuit's present adher-
ence to the prevailing view. y" In Letelier, a Chilean dissident
leader and his secretary were assassinated in Washington D.C.
when a bomb placed in their car exploded.7' Even though the
assassination order presumably took place in Chile, not the
United States,72 the district court permitted jurisdiction under
the noncommercial torts exception.73 The court held that a
foreign country was not entitled to engage in conduct so outra-
geous as an assassination attempt, an action clearly contrary to
established principles of humanity as recognized in both na-
tional and international law.74 Because the circumstances of
the case so offended the court, it was sufficient that only the
death or injury occurred in the United States.
D. The Discretionary Functions Provision
The discretionary functions provision 75 of the noncom-
mercial torts exception is a modification of the restrictive the-
ory of sovereign immunity. Although the Supreme Court re-
cently held that "[flor the most part, the Act codifies, as a mat-
ter of federal law, the restrictive theory, ' 76 it is clear that the
discretionary function provision both modifies and exceeds the
scope of the old common law doctrine, within the context of
the United States); see Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567. However, the Ninth Circuit also
seems more willing to accomodate this position to its needs. See infra notes 126-30
and accompanying text.
69. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D. D.C. 1980).
70. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. 665.
71. Id.
72. The district court determined that the acts complained of "may well have
been carried out entirely within [Chile]." Id. at 674.
73. Id. at 673-74. The district court determined that even though the acts took
place in Chile, the defendant foreign sovereign would not be permitted to defeat the
purpose of the FSIA "through the back door, under the guise of the act of state
doctrine." Id. at 674 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6619); see supra notes
38 and 67.
74. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673.
75. 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(5)(A). This states that the torts exception will not apply
to "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be
abused .... " Id.
76. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
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the torts exception." The few decisions which have addressed
the discretionary functions provision agree that in order to de-
termine the scope of 1605(a)(5)(A), it is necessary to refer to
the interpretation given the similar Federal Tort Claims Act 78
provision.79
The Supreme Court set forth the basic test for discretion-
ary functions in Dalehite v. United States.8 0 The Dalehite court
held that discretion means "more than the initiation of pro-
grams and activities. It also includes determinations made by
executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifica-
tions or schedules of operations. Where there is room for pol-
icy judgment and decision there is discretion."'" That stan-
dard should be employed when determining whether the tor-
tious act of a foreign sovereign was based on a discretionary
function.8 2
Only three reported cases have analyzed and discussed the
discretionary functions provision of the torts exception to the
FSIA.8" In each case, the Dalehite standard of discretion guid-
ed the court.84 In Letelier, the court stated the section
77. As the De Sanchez court noted, official conduct is no longer immune from suit
simply because it is "governmental." De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 914. The FSIA goes
further than the public and private dichotomy of the restrictive approach. Congress
intended that some governmental decisions should not be subject to judicial review,
which is why it created an exception to the general waiver of sovereign immunity
through the discretionary functions provision. Id.; see Olsen, 729 F.2d at 645.
Few reported decisions have actually reached and decided the discretionary
functions issue, for the FSIA jurisdictional issue is often decided early in a court's
analysis. See Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646-48; Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567; De Sanchez, 515 F.
Supp. at 914; Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673.
78. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1976).
79. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 647; Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567; Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at
673. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) with 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
80. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
81. Id. at 35-36 (footnotes omitted). Thus, government executives would be
able to make policy decisions without fearing suit for abuse of discretion. Id. at 32-
33; see Olsen, 729 F.2d at 647.
82. However, this standard has been somewhat refined and qualified since the
Dalehite decision. A discretionary function may be one made at the "planning" rather
than the "operational" level, and decisions made at the latter level may be actionable
even though they involve an element of discretion. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 647; Lindgren
v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1982); Thompson v. United States, 592
F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979).
83. See Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646-47; Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567; Letelier, 488 F. Supp.
at 673.
84. See Olsen, 729 F.2d at 647; Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567; Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at
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1605(a)(5)(A) test by asking whether the act complained of, an
assassination order, involved policy judgment and decision.15
The court concluded that the act complained of was not discre-
tionary.8" Next, in In Re Sedco, Inc. ,87 the court compared the
actions complained of, the planning of an exploration pro-
gram, to those considered in Dalehite.8" The Sedco court held
that the acts were discretionary and that the defendant foreign
sovereign would retain immunity under section 1605(a)(5)(A)
of the FSIA." '  Most recently, in Olsen by Sheldon v. Government of
Mexico," the court incorporated the Dalehite standard into its
analysis and determined that the tortious acts and ommissions
which ultimately led to a plane crash were not discretionary.9'
These three cases show that a court should measure an act or
omission against the Dalehite standard when determining
whether a particular act or omission is a discretionary function
of a foreign state or its agents.
E. Relieffor a Tortious Wrong Under the FSIA
Section 1605(a)(5) of the noncommercial torts exception
85. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673.
86. Id. In Letelier, the court reasoned that there is no discretion to commit, or to
have one's officers or agents commit, an illegal act. See Hatahley v. United States, 351
U.S. 173, 181 (1956); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Ha-
waii 1977).
87. 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
88. Id. at 567.
89. Id.
90. 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984).
91. Id. at 647. The court also considered the Ninth Circuit distinction between
planning and operational levels of government actions. The court stated:
Because decisions at the planning level establish governmental policy, they
are not actionable. But where decisions occur at the operational level, the
discretionary function exemption provides no protection from liability even
though such decisions or acts may involve elements of discretion. . . . In
addition to examining the level at which the conduct occurred, we also con-
sider two other factors which are particularly important when determining
the immunity of foreign states: The ability of United States courts to evalu-
ate the act or omission of the state, and the potential impairing effects such
an evaluation would have on the effective administration of the state's gov-
ernment. ...
We conclude that of those alleged acts or omissions on the part of Mex-
ico which contributed to the [plane crash], none was discretionary. ...
While the pilot and air controllers had considerable discretion in carrying
out their assigned tasks .... it is clear they acted on the operational level, far
from the centers of policy judgement.
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refers only to money damages for personal injury, death and
property damage. However, the legislative history of the
FSIA indicates that other relief may also be appropriate.""
Liability under the FSIA is provided for in section 1606.!"4
The statute provides for compensatory damages, and also pu-
nitive damages in specified situations. Section 1606 does not
provide for assessment of punitive damages against a foreign
state itself, but rather, against an agency or instrumentality of
that foreign state. ' The Letelier court awarded compensatory
damages only against the Republic of Chile, and both compen-
satory and punitive damages against its agents."
However, as the plaintiffs discovered in Letelier, the only
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). Specifically with regard to individual and property
damages, at least one case has determined that the tortious conduct need not result
in physical damage. De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. at 913. Although the defendant foreign
state in De Sanchez contended that tort recovery ought to be limited to "casualty-
type," that is, physical damage to property or to the person, the court held that this
argument construed section 1605(a)(5) too narrowly. Id. at 913. The statutory lan-
guage permits recovery for both damage and loss of property, indicating that Congress
intended to allow plaintiffs to recover both pure monetary and casualty loss equally
under the Act. Id. Moreover, certain non-physical damage torts such as libel, slan-
der, deceit, misrepresentation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and interfer-
ence with contract rights are expressly excluded by the noncommercial torts excep-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). However, other kinds of torts are not specifically
excluded. For example, "loss of property" is provided for by the noncommercial
torts exception. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
93. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. This provides:
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled
to immunity tinder section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state
shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or
instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages; if, however,
in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where the action
or omission occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for dam-
ages only punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be liable for actual or
compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from
such death which were incurred by the persons for whose benefit the action
was brought.
Id.
95. Id. Moreover, when the act or omission complained of has caused death, the
statute notes that the law of the place where the act or omission occurred may pro-
vide for punitive damages only, rather than actual or compensatory damages as in-
tended by the FSIA. Such law will not preclude the damage award; the foreign state
will be liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the plaintiff's pecuni-
ary injuries. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. No tort case has discussed this provision thus far.
96. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259, 266-67 (D. D.C. 1980).
Attorney expenses and fees were also awarded. Id. at 267-68.
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case to discuss this relief issue, an award of damages was
merely a symbolic victory. In a subsequent action, the plain-
tiffs attempted to execute the judgment by a levy on LAN Chile
Airlines, a commercial airline owned by the Republic of
Chile.97 After determining that LAN's assets could be levied
upon as assets of the Republic of Chile,9" the court held that
the FSIA tort and commercial claims sections were not mutu-
ally exclusive. Therefore, a plaintiff who asserted jurisdiction
under the torts exception could also recover under the com-
mercial claims provision. 99 In part, the court also based this
finding on the common sense notion that, in the absence of
express Congressional intent, a statute is not ordinarily inter-
preted to create a right without a remedy. 00
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the District Court,' 0 ' and held that sections
1605(a)(2) and 1605(a)(5) were in fact mutually exclusive.10 2
Because the initial denial of immunity was based on the non-
commercial torts exception, the Court of Appeals held that it
would have been inconsistent for the court to deny LAN's as-
sets immunity from execution based on a finding that the activ-
ities were commercial in nature. 10 3 The court, ruling on the
appeal of another case in the same matter, " 4 reluctantly re-
versed, 10 5 and held that Congress did in fact create a right
97. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
98. Id. at 1497-98.
99. Id. at 1499-1500. The commercial claims section of the FSIA states that:
(a) the property in the United States of a foreign state .... used for a com-
mercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment
in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court
of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if-
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which
the claim is based....
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
100. De Letelier, 567 F. Supp. at 1500.
101. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2656 (1985).
102. Id. at 795-99.
103. Id. at 795.
104. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 575 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (judg-
ment creditors moved for appointment of receiver), rev'd, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.
1984).
105. Letelier, 748 F.2d at 791. Even though the court found in favor of the for-
eign state on this issue it said:
We reverse although we recognize that our decision may preclude the plain-
tiffs from collecting on their judgment. How one wishes to decide a case
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without a remedy. 0 6 The holding in Letelier implies that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has not solved pre-FSIA
problems as well as had been anticipated.1
0 7
In addition to, or instead of, money damages, the legisla-
tive history indicates that a plaintiff may request injunctive re-
lief or specific performance.'0 8 No reported case has yet ap-
proached this issue. Moreover, if a foreign state failed to com-
ply, it is doubtful that a court would be able to use its contempt
power.' '9 A plaintiff would again have to rely on political and
executive pressure exerted by the State Department as in the
days of the common law restrictive theory.' °
III. APPROACH TO EVALUATING A SECTION 1605(a)(5)
CLAIM
When evaluating a claim under the noncommercial torts
exception to the FSIA, a step by step analysis that considers
present trends in case law may be useful in determining
whether jurisdiction will be granted."' An example of this
analysis follows, illustrated by the recent case of Olsen by Sheldon
comes lightly to mind, on a wing; but often how one must decide it comes
arduously, weighed down by somber thought. To rule otherwise here would
only illustrate once again that hard cases make bad law.
Id.
106. Id. at 798. The court based this reasoning on (1) the fact that neither the
European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol of 1972 nor The
State Immunity Act of 1978 insures execution ofjudgment by attachment of the for-
eign state's property, even where jurisdiction is validly asserted, and (2) its conclu-
sion that Congress did not intend to lift execution immunity wholly, especially in
cases where the foreign state itself was the defendant.
Legislative history also reveals that the commercial claims section does not apply
to actions predicated on the noncommercial torts exception. It states that immunity
from execution will be denied "provided that the commercial activity gave rise to the
claim upon which the judgment is based." HousE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6627 (empha-
sis added).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27 (detailing pre-FSIA problems fac-
ing tort plaintiffs).
108. HousE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6621.
109. Further, in view of the finding by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit that there exists a right without a remedy, see supra notes 10 1-07 and accompany-
ing text, it seems unlikely that a court would try to enforce an order for specific
performance or an injunction.
110. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
111. This method of analysis may be approached on a step by step basis as fol-
lows:
A. Is the defendant foreign state a proper defendant within the meaning of the
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v. Government of Mexico,' 12 and offers a practical demonstration
of this methodology.
In Olsen, the plaintiffs were minor children who claimed
relief for the wrongful death of their parents.' ' The plaintiffs'
parents were killed in a plane crash while the Mexican govern-
ment transported them from Mexico to the United States." 4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that
the defendant foreign sovereign could not be granted immu-
nity under the noncommercial torts exception, and that subject
matter and personal jurisdiction existed under the FSIA." 5
The threshold inquiry of any evaluation of a section
1605(a)(5) claim should be whether the potential defendant is
a proper defendant under the FSIA. For example, in Olsen, the
named defendant was the Mexican government itself, owner
and operator of the aircraft. Courts generally construe the is-
FSIA? If no, the analysis may quickly end here and foreign sovereign immunity will
not be denied by the courts based on the FSIA. If yes,
B. Is the nature of the tort proper under section 1605(a)(5)? If yes,
C. Have both the 'act and injury' occurred within the United States? If yes,
D. Are the tortious acts or omissions discretionary? If no,
E. Ifjurisdiction may be properly granted under section 1605(a)(5), can plaintiff
execute the judgment?
Thus, if the analysis fails at any step, the claim will not succeed tinder section
1605(a)(5) and it is unnecessary to go on to the remaining steps.
112. 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 295 (1984).
113. Id. at 643.
114. Id. In October of 1979, a twin-engine plane owned and operated by the
Mexican government departed from Monterrey, Mexico for Tijuana. The plane was
carrying the plaintiffs' parents, who were prisoners of the Mexican government being
transferred to the United States pursuant to the Prisoner Exchange Treaty between
the United States and Mexico. Id. Due to thick fog and diminishing visibility at their
destination, the pilots requested an instrument landing which would require the
plane to temporarily enter United States airspace so it could approach the Tijuana
runway from the west. Id. Tijuana air control sought and received permission for the
airplane to cross the border. Id. Because its radar and instrument landing naviga-
tional system were inoperative, Tijuana air control requested that its counterpart in
San Diego radio the data necessary for an instrument landing to the airplane. Id.
Neither the San Diego air controllers nor the pilots were bilingual, so the information
was relayed through a telephone "hotline" to Tijuana who passed the information
along. Id. at 644. The aircraft then penetrated United States airspace, made a wide
turn, and began to descend toward Tijuana Airport. Id. However, the plane strayed
one mile off course and re-entered Mexican airspace. Id. At this point, San Diego
advised that the plane try another airport where visibility would be better, but the
pilot refused and re-entered United States airspace. Id. The pilots failed to maintain
the proper altitude, struck a telephone pole, and crashed three-quarters of a mile
inside the United States, killing all on board. Id.
115. Id. at 648-49.
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sue of the proper defendant broadly, and for the benefit of
both parties."" A foreign state has never been denied immu-
nity at this initial stage of inquiry simply because it was not the
proper defendant for the action.7
A second consideration for the courts is whether the na-
ture of the tort at issue falls under section 1605(a)(5) of the
FSIA. On the face of the statute, certain actions are strictly
forbidden and will never result in denial of immunity." 8 Addi-
tionally, certain property actions, personal injury actions, and
wrongful death actions have been well received by the courts
as proper tort claims under section 1605(a)(5)." 9 To illus-
trate, the action in Olsen was for wrongful death. ' 2 0 The statute
explicitly provides for this tort; 12 1 in fact, wrongful death ac-
tions constitute the majority of tort claims under the FSIA.' -2 2
The plaintiffs in Olsen did not allege any claims for consequent-
ial damages, such as mental distress, which, in any case, has
never been well received by the courts.12 3 Because the courts
interpret narrowly the appropriateness of a tort claim in a sec-
tion 1605(a)(5) action, 24 the plaintiffs in Olsen did well to re-
strict themselves to the best-established cause of action.
In determining whether the nature of the tort is acceptable
under section 1605(a)(5), courts have emphasized that only
those torts which have occurred in the United States are ac-
tionable. 2 5 The Olsen court recognized the accepted rule' -' 1
that both the act and the injury must occur in the United
States.2 7 Straining to fit the case to this established rule, the
court declared that many potentially tortious acts and omis-
116. See supra text accompanying notes 51-64 (the proper defendant for a sec-
tion 1605(a)(5) case).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 51-64 (the proper defendant for a sec-
tion 1605(a)(5) case).
118. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (libel, slander, deceit, misrepre-
sentation, interference with contract, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process are
prohibited causes of action).
119. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
120. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 643.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
122. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
127. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646.
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sions occurred in both the United States and Mexico.' 21 The
court reasoned that requiring every aspect of the tortious con-
duct to occur in the United States would only encourage for-
eign defendants to allege that some tortious conduct occurred
outside the United States.' 29 The court concluded therefore
that the accepted rule would be satisfied if at least one entire
tort occurred in the United States.130 Consequently, every tor-
tious act or omission will be placed under court scrutiny re-
gardless of the situs of the act or omission, even though only
one of the torts alleged occurred wholely in the United States.
This coat-tail interpretation has yet to be followed by any other
court.
The next step to consider is whether the tortious acts or
omissions complained of are discretionary.' 3 ' This requires
the application of the Dalehite standard. 32  Recognizing the
Dalehite standard as applying equally to Federal Tort Claims
Act and FSIA cases, the Olsen court determined that none of
the alleged acts or omissions were discretionary. 33 The court
stated that the negligent acts alleged by the plaintiffs were not
implicated as discretionary in the instant case, though the
broad policy of prisoner exchange may have been discretion-
ary.' 34 The negligent acts in question were the acts of trans-
portation and of piloting, acts which were clearly operational
and far from the centers of policy and judgment. 35
Finally, should the court not grant immunity and the
plaintiff prevail, the proper remedy for the plaintiff can be con-
sidered. This final step has no firm precedent to guide it, be-
cause this issue has only been examined once, in Letelier. 3 1 In
Olsen, the plaintiffs were not actually awarded damages because
the case at hand merely conferred jurisdiction on a California
court. 13 Assuming arguendo, however, that the plaintiffs were
awarded damages, they might not be able to recover if the
128. Id. at 645.
129. Id. at 646.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
133. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646-47.
134. Id. at 647.
135. Id.
136. Letelier, 748 F.2d 790; see supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
137. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 649.
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Ninth Circuit follows the Second Circuit opinion in Letelier.' 1
CONCLUSION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act codified the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity and provided a means
for plaintiffs to bring suit against a defendant foreign state in a
United States court. Since that time, a body of law intended to
provide consistency and conformity of foreign sovereign im-
munity law has evolved. The federal courts have established
certain trends of statutory interpretation of the noncommercial
torts exception to the FSIA. The choice of a proper defendant
under this statute is an issue open to a broad construction; any
foreign state and many of its agencies and instrumentalities
may be sued under section 1605(a)(5). M' However, these
courts have narrowly interpreted which torts will provide a
valid cause of action under the FSIA. 140 Only those acts or
omissions that cause personal injury, death, or loss of or dam-
age to property may give rise to a permissible cause of ac-
tion.' 4 ' Moreover, both the tortious act or ommission and the
resultant injury or death must occur in the United States. 4 2 In
addition, torts attributable to discretionary functions are not
actionable under the FSIA. '43 Finally, one court has held that
the noncommercial torts section of the FSIA has created a
right without any effective remedy, suggesting that judgments
entered in favor of a plaintiff may be unenforceable.' 44
Not only is it difficult to execute a judgment in cases where
section 1605(a)(5) is used, but it is indeed a rare occurrence
for a plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign
through section 1605(a)(5). Since the FSIA was enacted in
1976, only three reported cases have conferred jurisdiction on
the plaintiff.'4 5 In two 4 6 of these three, the action was for
138. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text (detailing the choice of a
proper defendant under the torts exception).
140. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text (detailing the scope of the
discretionary functions provision).
144. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
145. Olsen, 729 F.2d 641; Letelier, 488 F. Supp. 665; De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. 900.
146. Olsen, 729 F.2d 641; Letelier, 488 F. Supp. 665.
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wrongful death, and the other was for conversion.
147
A plaintiff does not have a favorable chance of obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign who has committed a tor-
tious act or omission, even with the aid of the FSIA. Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court has declined to clarify this
growing body of law, denying certiorari in every instance that
an appeal has been made. 148
Judi L. Abbott
147. De Sanchez, 515 F. Supp. 900.
148. Letelier, 748 F.2d 790; Asociacion, 735 F.2d 1517; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774;
Persinger, 729 F.2d 835; Olsen, 729 F.2d 641; Berkovitz, 735 F.2d 329; McKeel, 722 F.2d
582; Perez, 652 F.2d 186.
